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The social and budgetary impacts of recent social 
security reform in Belgium 
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• Separate Bismarckian PAYG schemes for employees in the private 
and public sectors and self-employed. Civil servants pensions are 
regarded as deferred earnings. 
• Earnings related scheme with redistributive elements (e.g. ceiling 
of maximum pension amount) 
• Individual benefit or ‘family benefit’ 
• Means-tested guaranteed minimum pension benefit (GRAPA) 
• Official retirement age is 65, but retirement is possible from 60 on 
• Conventional Early Leavers Scheme (CELS) 
• Disability Scheme 
• Average ‘pure’ first-pillar old-age benefit: € 1,030 (for 
employees), € 2,272 (for civil servants)  in 2007. 
 
First-pillar pensions in Belgium 
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• Conditions for early retirement:  
Age condition gradually increases from 60 to 62 in 2016 
Minimum career length immediately increases from 35 to 38 years, and 
then gradually to 40 years in 2015 
Most civil servants now become subject to the same conditions as 
employees 
• Adaptation of the rules for calculating the benefit 
Equivalent periods unemployed/UCA are now evaluated by the minimum 
right per career year 
The early-retirement penalty for self-employed is reduced and abandoned 
for those of 63 and older, or who have a long career. 
Regimes for specific civil servants (university professors!) are abandoned 
The pension benefit of all civil servants younger than 50 (1/1/2012) is now 
based on the last 10 years of the career 
Possibilities for ‘equivalent periods’ are extended for civil servants of 50 
and older 
An overall cap of 5 years is introduced for equivalent periods (except for 
‘thematic career breaks’) 
 
 
 
Pension reform 
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• Unemployment 
Cohabiting with dependants, singles: 3rd period unemployment 
introduced after 3 years; benefit is a minimum 
Cohabiting:  2nd period becomes shorter 
Benefit increases from 60 to 65 of last earnings during the 1st 
period 
Benefit is decreasing over time during the 2nd period 
Age condition for seniority supplement: was 50 years of age and 
career of 20 years; now 55 years of age 
 
• Conventional Early Leavers’ Scheme (CELS) 
Replaced by Unemployment with Company Allowance (UCA) 
Entry conditions restricted (minimum age from 58 to 60; career 
condition from 35 to 40 years) 
Part-time CELS abandoned 
 
 
Unemployment/Conventional Early Leavers’ scheme 
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Tango, anyone? 
‘Channels of consistency’ of MIDAS with 
MALTESE 
 
1. State alignment 
2. Monetary alignment 
3. Joint social hypotheses 
MALTESE 
(macro) 
MIDAS 
(micro) 
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• Starting dataset: individuals, grouped in households 
  (survey, administrative data) 
• Individuals pass through all stages of life:  
  birth, marriage, divorce, children, widowhood, 
 death 
 
• Individuals  find a job, lose it, become eligible 
 to a social security benefit (or not),  
 build up a pension... 
 
• Individuals enter into retirement and receive a pension benefit based on 
their previous career 
 
   
MIDAS: an overview 
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The microsimulation model MIDAS : ready to 
tango 
 
 Alignment of state variables:  
 Procedure to have the model respect or ‘mimic’ exogenous aggregates while 
respecting individual probabilities in the occurrence of the event 
– Behavioral equation determining the probability of the transition 
– Individuals are ranked depending on the obtained probability (from the highest to the 
lowest) 
– The number of selected individuals reproduces targeted aggregates 
 Monetary alignment or ‘amount alignment’: 
 Proportional adjustment of first-run values of earnings to match exogenous 
macroeconomic productivity growth rates 
 Uprating 
 Of social security benefits 
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Assumptions and hypotheses of the Study 
Committee on Ageing 
Key demographic hypotheses 2007 2011 2030 2060 
Fertility 1.81 1.84 1.86 1.77 
Life expectancy at birth 
Men 77.3 78.2 81.9 86.2 
women 83.3 83.4 85.8 88.8 
Key macro hypotheses 2011-2017 ≥ 2015 
Yearly productivity 0.8% pa 1.50% 
Unemployment rate 11.9 in 2017 Decreasing towards 8% 
Social policy hypotheses 2010-2012 2013-2014 ≥ 2015 
Wage ceiling Current legislation agreement of 
December 2011 
1.25% 
Minimum right per working year 1.25% 
Welfare adjustment non-lump-sum 
benefits  
Employed and self-employed 
0.50% 
Welfare adjustment of lump-sum benefits 1.00% 
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The impact of social security reform 
 
Macroeconomics and labour market 
Base scenario (with reforms) Impact of reforms 
2011 2030 2060 2030 2060 
Participation rate (labour forcea in % of population 15-64 
years) 
72.7 74.2 74.5 1.0 1.0 
15-54 years 76.5 75.6 75.6 -0.2 -0.1 
55-64 years 52.9 64.0 64.9 5.8 6.2 
Employment rate (total employment in % of population 15-64 
years) 
64.0 68.0 68.5 0.9 1.0 
15-54 years 68.3 70.0 70.2 -0.2 -0.1 
55-64 years 42.0 55.1 56.3 5.2 5.6 
Unemployment rate (unemployment in % of labour forcea) 11.9 8.5 8.0 0.1 0.0 
CELS/UCA rate (% of potential labour forceb 50-64 years) 8.0 5.9 5.6 -1.5 -1.5 
Base scenario (with reforms) Impact of the reforms 
Average annual growth rates in real terms in % Level in % 
2011-2030 2030-2060 2011-2060 2011-2030 2030-2060 2011-2060 2030 2060 
GDP 1.6 1.7 1.7 O.07 0.00 0.03 1.3 1.4 
Productivity 1.1 1.5 1.3 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.0 0.0 
Employment 0.5 0.2 0.3 0.07 0.00 0.03 1.3 1.4 
Table 2 Labour market: base scenario (with reform) and impact of the structural reforms  
(difference between projection with and without reform in percentage point) 
Table 3 Macroeconomic projection: base scenario (with reform) and impact of the structural reforms  
(difference between projection with and without reform in % 
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Table 4 Budgetary costs of ageing: base scenario of the Study Committee of Ageing (with reform) and impact of the reforms  
(difference between projection with and without reform), October 2012 
% of GDP 
The impact of social security reform 
 
Budgetary costs 
Components of the budgetary 
costs 
Base scenario (with reforms) Impact of reforms 
2011 2030 2060 2011-2060 2011-2030 2011-
2060 
Pensions 9.9 13.6 14.5 4.6 -0.2 -0.1 
- wage-earners 5.4 7.6 7.8 2.5 -0.2 -0.1 
- self-employed 0.8 1.0 1.1 0.3 0.0 0.0 
- civil servants 3.7 5.0 5.6 1.8 -0.1 0.1 
Health Carea 8.0 9.4 11.0 3.0 0.0 0.0 
Disability schemes 1.6 1.6 1.5 -0.1 0.0 0.0 
Unemploymentb 2.0 1.3 1.1 -0.9 -0.1 -0.1 
CELS/UCA 0.4 0.3 0.3 -0.2 -0.1 -0.1 
Children benefits 1.6 1.6 1.4 -0.2 0.0 0.0 
Other social expenditures 1.7 1.7 1.6 -0.1 0.0 0.0 
Total 25.3 29.5 31.4 6.1 -0.5 -0.3 
Source: High Council of Finance, Study Committee of Ageing, Yearly Report 2012 
a. Public expenditure, inclusive long-term care. 
b. Inclusive time credit and career breaks  
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• CELS/UCA (-0.1%): reduction of beneficiaries 
 
• Unemployment (-0.1%; especially in the long term): less 
career breaks, more importantly: lower benefits due to  
-Decrease of unemployment benefit with duration unemployment 
-Increased eligibility age for seniority supplement 
 
• Pension (-0.2% middle term, -0.1% long term).  
-In the middle term the number of pensioners decreases 
-In the long term, these individuals will eventually retire and 
receive a higher pension benefit. In the systems of employees and 
self-employed, these effects cancel each other out, but in the 
civil servants’ scheme, costs will in the long run increase. 
 
The impact of social security reform 
 
Budgetary costs 
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The impact of social security reform 
 
Social impact 
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Male - with reform Female - with reform Male - without reform Female - without reform 
Risk of poverty rate of retirees by gender, in percent  
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The impact of social security reform 
 
Social impact 
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The impact of social security reform 
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Commercial break: LIAM2 
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Conclusions 
1. This paper assesses the sustainability and adequacy impact of 
recent social security reform in Belgium 
2. As a result of this reform, the budgetary costs of ageing are 
reduced by 0.3%-point GDP, evenly distributed between 
pensions, unemployment and CELS/UCA. 
3. In amounts (so without taking into account the increasing GDP 
which results from decreasing unemployment), the costs are 
reduced as well, but the picture is less clear-cut. 
4. So the impact of the reform is mainly via the higher employment 
rate and the resulting higher GDP growth rate. 
5. The risk of poverty of pensioners decreases as a result of the 
reform. This effect is faster for men than for women 
6. The poverty risk for (male!) unemployed increases considerably 
7. The reform thus reinforces the existing AROP profiles 
between the unemployed and retired 
8. Interested in microsimulation? You really ought to try LIAM2! 
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